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1. Introduction  
The parent/child relationship lies at the heart of family life – and family law.  Legal parental 
status1 gives rise to parental responsibilities and rights, rights to aliment and child support, 
rights in succession, and it carries consequences for domicile and immigration.  Still more 
fundamentally, the recognition in law of the parent/child bond is critically significant for both 
the parent and child:  
What, after all, to any child, to any parent, never mind to future generations and 
indeed to society at large, can be more important, emotionally, psychologically, 
                                                          
1 Terms such as “parent” “parenting” “parenthood” and “parentage” can be used (sometimes interchangeably) to 
refer both to the genetic progenitors of the child, and to the persons who have day-to-day responsibility for the 
child: the genetic parents and the social parents respectively. In many cases, these will be the same two persons. 
For the avoidance of ambiguity however, the term “legal parental status” will be used here to refer to the people 
treated in law (rather than in social or psychological terms) as the parents of the child, and who have the legal 
responsibilities and rights which follow therefrom.  
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socially and legally, than the answer to the question: Who is my parent? Is this my 
child?2   
Yet how should the parent/child relationship be identified in law?  Traditionally Scots law has 
given priority to the bloodline or genetic bond,3 and this has only (relatively) recently been 
dislodged in limited circumstances, namely “full legal transplant” adoption4 and legally 
regulated assisted conception.5 In these cases, the law recognises a break in the genetic link 
between parent and child, and ascribes full legal parental status to specified adults, in tightly 
defined circumstances. In cases of natural insemination, however, biological lineage still 
reigns supreme. In the case of fathers, Professor Hacker argues that paternity is seen “almost 
exclusively as a biological fact”.6 Yet this makes it impossible for the law to recognise other 
bases as a foundation for legal parental status:  “the gene focus of the current regime means 
that the law cannot knowingly accept a formal father-child relationship without a genetic link.  
And that link becomes easier and easier to scrutinise.”7  Given the wide range of social 
relationships which can form the basis of family life, relying exclusively on a genetic link to 
establish legal parental status may fail to meet the needs of parents and children. The time 
has come for Scots law to revisit the question of what makes a parent, in the eyes of the law.  
Biology may be one element, but it need not be the only – or essential – one.   
 
This question requires us to grapple with the fundamental issue of the significance of genetics 
versus psychological or social parenthood. As Lady Hale identified, “natural” (rather than 
legal) parenthood may arise in at least three ways: genetic, gestational, and psychological, 
and has recognised the value of all three: “each of [these] may be a very significant factor in 
                                                          
2 A and others in the matter of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, [2015] EWHC 2602 (Fam), 
para 3, per Sir James Munby. 
3 That is, Scots law has treated the two biological parents as the legal parents. Before genetics could be 
ascertained through DNA testing, reliance was placed on blood tests (Docherty v McGlynn 1983 SLT 645) or 
family resemblances (Grant v Countess of Seafield 1926 SC 144). 
4 Full legal transplant adoption was first recognised in the Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act 1930.  It is now 
regulated by the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 and the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007. See also 
AB Wilkinson and Kenneth McK Norrie, The Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland, 3rd edn by Kenneth 
McK Norrie (SULI, 2013), paras 21.01-21.07. 
5 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 ss33-47 sets out who will be the mother and the father or 
other parent in cases of donor conception and IVF treatment. In the case of surrogacy, s54 makes provision for 
identifying the first legal parent(s) and thereafter transferring that legal parental status to the commissioning 
couple. 
6 Birke Hacker, “Honour Runs in the Blood”, (2017) LQR 36 at 39. 
7 Birke Hacker, “Honour Runs in the Blood”, (2017) LQR 36 at 39. 
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the child's welfare, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case.”8 In her words, 
these three routes to natural parenthood can be described as follows:  
 
The first is genetic parenthood: the provision of the gametes which produce the 
child. This can be of deep significance on many levels. For the parent, perhaps 
particularly for a father, the knowledge that this is "his" child can bring a very special 
sense of love for and commitment to that child which will be of great benefit to the 
child... For the child, he reaps the benefit not only of that love and commitment, but 
also of knowing his own origins and lineage, which is an important component in 
finding an individual sense of self as one grows up…  
The second is gestational parenthood: the conceiving and bearing of the child… a 
relationship which is different from any other. 
The third is social and psychological parenthood: the relationship which develops 
through the child demanding and the parent providing for the child's needs, initially 
at the most basic level of feeding, nurturing, comforting and loving, and later at the 
more sophisticated level of guiding, socialising, educating and protecting.9  
 
Given these alternative routes to “natural” parenthood, and the very real significance of all 
three to the adult and child, we need to examine whether it is sufficient to have just one route 
to legal parental status. Is biology rightly placed at the heart of the legal parent/child 
relationship? What factor(s) should the legal system use to determine who the legal parents 
are, and how it can adjudge between competing claims? Our failure so far to address these 
prior questions has led to a lack of clarity and understanding of what might result when 
questions of (typically) paternity arise, and are sought to be resolved solely through reference 
to biology and genetics.  If we are to apply the scientific certainties of genetics and DNA 
testing to the parent/child relationship, we need to have a clear legal and social 
understanding of what those results should tell us.  Should they simply provide information 
as to who the genetic progenitor is?  Or should they determine who the legal parent is? 
                                                          
8 In re G (children) [2006] UKHL 43, paras 33.  
9 In re G (children) [2006] UKHL 43, paras 33-35. In relation to gestational parenthood, Lady Hale emphasised 
the significance of this, but it is not the direct focus of this article. As Lady Hale said: “the process of carrying a 
child and giving him birth (which may well be followed by breast-feeding for some months) brings with it, in 
the vast majority of cases, a very special relationship between mother and child, a relationship which is different 





Before moving on to analyse these issues, three preliminary points can be made.  First, and 
critically, I wish to emphasise that I am not advocating any denial of the biological or genetic 
“truth”.  There is no need to deny someone information about their genetic antecedents or 
descendants. That two people are directly related as progenitor and offspring is an 
incontrovertible fact. My concern lies with translating that truth – a factual DNA result which 
identifies someone’s genetic heritage – into a legal “truth”, ie who should be recognised in 
law as a parent. This is particularly the case now it is possible to know with scientific certainty, 
through DNA testing, whether a genetic relationship exists. The old legal presumptions and 
social safeguards can be overturned with ease. Before we automatically equate genetics with 
legal parental status, we need to be clear as to the policy reasons for doing so, and be honest 
that this is what we are doing.   As the law currently stands, in Scotland at least, there has 
been no such debate about the status of genetics in the parent/child relationship, and this 
omission must be remedied. This need not however result in the suppression of biological or 
genetic knowledge, even if the legal consequences of such knowledge are revised. 
 
The second point is that, although the statutory language is, rightly, gender neutral, questions 
of parentage tend in fact to be questions of paternity.  As Professor Diduck has observed: 
disputed parentage was traditionally, and still is, virtually always about disputed 
paternity and so the ‘universal principles’ about a child’s need to know his or her 
identity developed from responses to questions about a child’s paternity. Adopting 
the gender-neutral language of identity or origins simply masks the importance thus 
attributed to knowledge of paternal lineage.10 
 
While this raises broader questions of the societal role for paternal lineage, it remains the 
case that parentage is typically a question of paternity.  If nothing else, the practical reality is 
that it is difficult (although not impossible11) to dispute who carried and gave birth to the 
                                                          
10 Alison Diduck, “‘If only we can find the appropriate terms to use the issue will be solved’: Law, identity and 
parenthood”, (2007) 19(4) CFLQ 458, at 468. 
11 Douglas v Duke of Hamilton (1769) 2 Pat 143, [1769] UKHL 2_Paton_143.  See also Lesley-Anne Barnes 
Macfarlane, “A Noise all over Europe: Douglas v Duke of Hamilton”, in John P Grant and Elaine E Sutherland 
(eds) Pronounced for Doom (Avizandum, 2013). In France, it is possible for a woman to give birth 
anonymously, under the doctrine of “accouchment sous X”, in which case there could be a question mark 
hanging over the identity of the biological mother: see further R. J. Blauwhoff, ‘Tracing down the historical 
development of the legal concept of the right to know one’s origins: Has “to know or not to know” ever been the 
legal question?’, (2008) Vol 4 Utrecht Law Review 99, at 108.  
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child.  Further, genetics is not relevant in the question of identifying the mother, since the law 
has opted to recognise the gestational mother as the legal mother in all cases.  In cases of 
natural insemination, the gestational mother will, of necessity, be the genetic mother. In 
those cases of assisted conception where a donor egg is used, the mother recognised by law 
will be the woman who carried the pregnancy, and not the woman who provided the genetic 
material.12  Therefore, using genetics to determine parentage is gendered in that it can only 
be the father who can have the presumption of parenthood set aside based exclusively on 
genetic evidence.  This is of course a concern in its own right, and the question of determining 
motherhood resulting from assisted conception may also need to be revisited.  For the 
present, however, this article will focus on the role of biology and genetics and will default to 
the presumption that the person whose genetic connection – and therefore whose legal 
parental status – is being established or overthrown is the father.    
 
The third preliminary point is to note that the following analysis will focus on cases of natural 
insemination, rather than assisted reproduction (whether donor or otherwise), surrogacy, 
and adoption.  In these specific cases, legal parental status is governed by detailed statutory 
regimes. There may be plenty that can be critically said about these regimes, but the present 
focus is on (i) the position of fathers and children where (ii) the conception has occurred 
through natural insemination.13 In such cases, the pater est presumption will apply. Now 
rendered in statutory form in s5(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 
1986 (the “1986 Act”),14 this is the presumption that pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant: 
the father is he whom the marriage points out, ie the father is the man married to the mother 
at the time of conception or birth. In the case of a man who is not married to the mother, a 
second statutory presumption is contained in s5(1)(b) of the 1986 Act, whereby he is 
presumed to be the father where both the father and mother have acknowledged him as the 
father, and he has been registered accordingly.15 The statutory basis for rebutting these 
                                                          
12 Section 33 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, which applies in all cases, including 
surrogacy. 
13 For this reason, the position of same sex parents is not specifically addressed. 
14 For a detailed account of s5 of the 1986 Act, including the modifications of the common law presumption in 
statutory form, and rebutting the presumption, see AB Wilkinson and Kenneth McK Norrie, The Law Relating 
to Parent and Child in Scotland, 3rd edn by Kenneth McK Norrie (SULI, 2013), paras 3.09 – 3.20. The 
discussion herein will focus on the statutory presumption, rather than the prior common law one. 
15 1986 Act, s5(1)(b), with reference to the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965. 
The interaction between these two presumptions is unclear: who is presumed to be the father where two 
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presumptions, through seeking a declarator of parentage or of non-parentage,16 merits a 
fresh analysis. The time is ripe to assess whether the legal criteria serve the interests of parent 
and children.   
 
2. Overturning the legal parent/child relationship in practice: the role of biology 
Determining the legal parent/child relationship is of great practical and theoretical 
significance. This question affects every child born in Scotland (save for those instances 
covered by specific statutory provision regarding adoption and assisted conception) – and of 
course, their parents. Yet for some children, the impact will be more forcibly felt than for 
others: statistics from the National Records of Scotland show that for the five years from 
2012-2016 there were on average 41 declarators of non-parentage received by them in each 
year.17 Although these figures are not definitive, as they may include declarators sought under 
the HFEA 2008 and there may also be separate court statistics, they nevertheless indicate that 
Scottish courts are being called upon to determine changes to a child’s legal parent 
subsequent to the initial birth registration.  And two Scottish decisions from the last few years 
have underlined, in different ways, the significance of why it is time to revisit this debate. 
 
The first is CS v KS and JS,18 a 2014 Sheriff Court decision which concerned a man who, 14 
years after his son was born (and only after divorcing from his wife), started to have suspicions 
that he may not have been the boy’s genetic father.  The husband’s new wife, and his own 
family, began to ask questions.  The husband therefore raised an action for a declarator of 
non-parentage in terms of section 7 of the 1986 Act, to establish that – despite the pater est 
                                                          
different men fulfil the two presumptions, ie one by being married to the mother and one by being 
acknowledged and registered as the father? It would be useful to have a clear statement as, for example, in the 
Family Law Act of British Columbia [SBC 2011], where s26(3) states “If more than one person may be 
presumed to be the child’s biological father, no presumption of paternity may be made.” A further lack of clarity 
exists regarding the relation between the statutory pater est presumption and the statutory ascription of legal 
parental status under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, whereby the father of the child 
conceived through the placing of gametes or an embryo in the woman is the man who fills the criteria in ss36 
and 36, but s38(3) then goes on to state that these provisions do not apply where any other enactment or rule of 
law does. The cumulative effect seems to be that, even in cases of donor insemination, the father will be 
identified first through s5 of the 1986 Act, but where that is challenged, the father will be identified through the 
2008 Act. See AB Wilkinson and Kenneth McK Norrie, The Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland, 3rd 
edn by Kenneth McK Norrie (SULI, 2013), paras 4.11-4.13. 
16 1986 Act, s7. See AB Wilkinson and Kenneth McK Norrie, The Law Relating to Parent and Child in 
Scotland, 3rd edn by Kenneth McK Norrie (SULI, 2013), paras 3.21 – 3.37   
17 The precise figures are: 2012 (41); 2013 (46); 2014 (40); 2015 (40); 2016 (40).  
18 CS v KS and JS [2014] SCLIVI 57.  See also Gillian Black, 'When is a Parent not a Parent?: CS v KS and JS 
and the Question of Genetic Parentage or Social Parenting', (2015) Edinburgh Law Review, Vol 19, pp 263-268. 
7 
 
presumption – he was not in fact the father.  The statutory test for a declarator of non-
parentage is largely undefined. Section 7 of the 1986 Act simply talks about raising an action 
for a declarator of parentage or non-parentage, and sets down criteria regarding standing and 
title in terms of domicile of the pursuer and the child. The only definition of parent is provided 
in section 8, which states that a parent “includes a natural parent”, without further expanding 
on any element of this.19 However, it is suggested that a declarator in terms of the 1986 Act 
could not be sought in relation to an adopted child or one conceived using assisted 
reproduction. In both those cases, separate statutory regimes apply,20 identifying the legal 
parent of the child. Accordingly, a declarator of parentage or non-parentage will only be 
relevant where the child is conceived naturally and the statutory pater est presumption, or 
the equivalent for unmarried parents, applies.21   Section 5 also states that the standard of 
proof for rebutting these presumptions is “a balance of probabilities”.22 It is critical to note 
that nowhere in the 1986 Act is the court required to consider the best interests of the child: 
the welfare principle has no role to play here. The other two prongs of the children’s rights 
triumvirate – the right to be express a view23 and the no order principle24 – are likewise 
absent.    
 
Although there is no statutory obligation to consider the best interests of the child, the sheriff 
did attempt to address issues of welfare and indeed the views of the pursuer’s son by citing 
him (as second defender) and by appointing a curator ad litem to have regard to his welfare. 
No appearance was entered by the curator, or either the first defender (the mother) or the 
son.25  Their position on this action is therefore unknown.   
                                                          
19 Since the 1986 Act predates (by some 20 years) Lady Hale’s judicial use of the term “natural parent” as 
encompassing genetic, gestational and psychological parents, it seems highly unlikely that the drafters of the 
1986 Act had these categories in mind. Rather, natural parent here presumably refers to the biological parent of 
a child conceived naturally.  
20 Respectively, the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 and the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007; and the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. 
21 Contained in the 1986 Act, s5(1). 
22 1986 Act, s5(4). 
23 The right of the child to express his or her views freely in all matters concerning him/her is one of the 
fundamental principles of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, contained in art 12, and given specific 
statutory recognition in a number of Scottish statutes: see for example the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, 
s11(7)(b). Typically, a child aged 12 and over is presumed in Scots law to be of sufficient age and maturity to 
form a view:  as for example in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s11(10). 
24 The principle that the court should only make an order concerning a child if it consider it better for the child 
that the order be made than that none should be made at all – which in effect prioritises the status quo. For a 
statutory example, see the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s11(7)(a). 




At the outset of CS’s application, the sheriff noted that the pursuer had a “genuine and 
proper” reason for bringing the action: his obligation to pay child maintenance.26 The 
parent/child relationship was thus reduced to an economic consideration, whereby the 
significant consequence of the legal relationship was deemed to be an obligation to support 
financially a genetic child. However, by the time the action was eventually heard, in July and 
August 2014, the son had passed his 17th birthday.27 At this point, most of the practical 
parenting issues, encapsulated in the father’s parental responsibilities and rights 28 had fallen 
away, together with most obligations of financial support, particularly in terms of the Child 
Support Act 1991 (as amended). The main legal consequences of a declarator in this case 
therefore were to end any succession rights and obligations, together with the remaining 
obligations of aliment.29   
 
On the basis of evidence from the father and various third parties,30 and drawing an inference 
(as he was entitled to do31) from the lack of DNA evidence provided by the ex-wife and son, 
who refused to engage with the litigation,32 the sheriff granted the declarator of non-
parentage. Essentially, the evidence pointed towards a lack of genetic relationship, and the 
refusal to provide DNA evidence led to the inference that there was something to hide.  
Cumulatively, and on a balance of probabilities, these suggested that the pursuer was not the 
genetic father – although he had been acting as the father for over 16 years (and, as far as 
                                                          
26 CS v KS and JS [2014] SC LIVI 57, para 5. 
27 His exact age or birthday were not given, but the date of conception was given as July or August 1996, which 
would result in a date of birth around May 1997, making him over 17 by July 2014. 
28 In terms of ss1 and 2 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. 
29 Questions of domicile may also have been affected, by depriving the son of his domicile of origin, though, as 
a 17 year old, he would presumably have a domicile of choice. 
30 The evidence included details that the son had dark skin, dark hair and brown eyes, in contrast to the pursuer 
and his former wife, who were described in the judgment as having “typical Scottish pale skin” and blue and 
green eyes.  There was also evidence from the pursuer’s brother that the former wife had had an affair at the 
time of conception (July and August 1996), with a local Asian man. 
31 Where a party refuses to provide a sample or consent to such testing, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990, section 70, enables a court to draw such adverse inference as seems to the 
court to be appropriate. 
32 And had previously refused to provide samples for DNA testing when requested by the father’s solicitors and 
by the Child Support Agency: para 5. 
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can be deduced from the case report, living in the family house until the son was nearly 1033).  
The sheriff therefore found and declared that the “Pursuer is not the father of the child JS.”34 
 
The legal consequence of the father’s successful petition was to sever the parent/child 
relationship in the eyes of the law.  The case report does not contain any insight into the social 
and emotional consequence: one is left to speculate as to the son’s reaction to this action, 
and the termination of the legal father/son relationship – and indeed, how the father felt 
when his petition was granted. Here, genetics (although not DNA evidence) overturned an 
established relationship, which had subsisted for at least the first ten years of the boy’s life, 
and which was also supported by the pater est presumption. 
 
Although not relevant in this case, it is also worth noting that there is no element of personal 
bar in such cases: if the pursuer had known at any earlier stage that his “son” had been 
conceived as a result of an extra-marital affair, but had still accepted him, legally and socially, 
as a son, not least through the pater est presumption, he could nevertheless have had 
recourse to a declarator of non-parentage at any later stage. 
 
The second decision is from the UK Privy Council and in a very different context.  In Pringle of 
Stichill,35  the father and son in question (Sir Norman and Norman: respectively the 8th and 9th 
baronets) had long since died, and the dispute was between their successors as to who should 
succeed to the baronetcy.  The action was raised by Murray, the eldest son of Sir Norman’s 
second son Ronald. His challenge was to the right to be enrolled as the 11th baronet, against 
Simon, the grandson of Sir Norman’s eldest son, Norman. The relevant elements of the family 
tree can be represented as follows:36 
 
 Sir Norman, 8th Baronet 
│  __________________________________________________ 
                    │                                                                                                             │ 
 
                                                          
33 The sheriff noted that the parties separated in about January 2007, although whether this was when the 
cohabitation ended is not clear. Para 7.  
34  CS v KS and JS [2014] SC LIVI 57, opening para (unnumbered). 
35 [2016] UKPC 16. 
36 This abbreviated family tree focuses only on the relevant parties to this dispute: other siblings, and spouses, 
have been omitted. 
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Norman, 9th Bt (born 1903) 
│ 
 Ronald (born 1905) 
│ 
Sir Steuart, 10th Bt 
│ 
 Murray 
Simon   
 
 
In support of his case, Murray relied upon DNA evidence available which pointed to the fact 
that Sir Norman’s eldest son (Norman, born 1903) could not possibly be related to him 
genetically. Despite this genetic evidence, the social evidence was that Norman, having been 
born in the marriage, had been accepted and raised as a child of the family, regardless of any 
doubts which Sir Norman may have had (and the evidence noted by the court was that there 
had been no such doubts37).  Norman’s position as the “cuckoo in the nest” had remained 
(largely38) hidden from his birth in 1903: he was enrolled without opposition39 as the 9th 
baronet on his father’s death in 1919, and in due course the title transferred on his death to 
his own son (the 10th baronet) in 1961.   
 
When DNA evidence in 2010 demonstrated that there was no genetic connection between 
the two Normans, the 8th and 9th baronets, the order of the Privy Council was to transfer the 
baronetcy away from the 9th baronet’s descendant, Simon, in favour of Murray, as the genetic 
descendant of the 8th baronet.  Although no ongoing parent/child relationship was destroyed 
in this case, nonetheless, the DNA evidence overturned nearly 100 years of succession, and 
led the Privy Council to suggest that the consequences of applying DNA evidence may merit 
closer consideration:  
In the past, the absence of scientific evidence meant that the presumption of 
legitimacy could rarely be rebutted and claims based on assertions that irregular 
procreations had occurred in the distant past were particularly difficult to establish. 
Not so now. It is not for the Board to express any view on what social policy should 
be. It notes the ability of DNA evidence to reopen a family succession many 
                                                          
37 In private writings from 1918-1919, the 8th Baronet narrated the breakdown of his marriage, but did not 
suggest he had any doubts as to the paternity of his eldest son, Norman: Pringle of Stichill, para 10. 
38 Sir Norman’s second son (and ultimately his legitimate heir) was Ronald. There was evidence from the sister 
of Ronald’s daughter-in-law, that Ronald had told her and her sister (who was married to Ronald’s younger son, 
ie the younger brother of Murray, the petitioner in this action) that Norman was in fact illegitimate and that he, 
Ronald, was thus the legitimate heir: Pringle of Stichill, para 9.  
39 Pringle of Stichill, para 8. 
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generations into the past. Whether this is a good thing and whether legal measures 
are needed to protect property transactions in the past, the rights of the perceived 
beneficiary of a trust of property, and the long established expectations of a family, 
are questions for others to consider.40 
 
Together, CS v KS and Pringle of Stichill demonstrate how an exclusive focus on genetics can 
set aside established parent/child relationships – and in doing so, suggest that the law’s focus 
on the genetic “truth” comes at the cost of the social “truth”.  In both cases, the pater est 
presumption was rebutted, without consideration of the social costs, or past property 
transactions, or the long established expectations of a family.  The current legislative regime 
for granting a declarator of non-parentage does not require any consideration of these costs 
or the wider circumstances of the case.  Instead, the parent/child relationship, parental 
responsibilities and rights, property transactions, and succession are all bound up in genetics.  
This may have the advantage of simplicity and certainty, but the downside should not be 
underestimated: “such an approach, cheap as it may be in terms of scientific proof, comes at 
a high social cost. It can endanger or destroy otherwise stable family bonds”.41 Is biology the 
best answer we can give to the question “Who then is my parent?”  
 
3. Changing Social and Legal Landscapes 
While there has been in Scotland no political or legal analysis of what should lie at the heart 
of the legal parent/child relationship, there has been law reform which has impacted on this 
question.   Scots law still operates on the presumption that the man married to the mother 
at the time of conception or birth is the father, with an equivalent statutory presumption for 
a man who is not married to the mother.42  Both these presumptions, for married and 
unmarried parents, strike a balance between protecting the man who socially occupies the 
role of father and has the support of the mother (either through her being married to him, or 
through her acknowledgement of him as the father), with an implication that the man filling 
this role will be the genetic father.  Although biology appears to be the underlying basis here, 
it is not the explicit criterion for being the father under these presumptions: rather the social 
role is.  Yet having given weight to the social role, as the basis of the statutory presumptions, 
                                                          
40 Ibid, para 80. 
41 Birke Hacker, “Honour Runs in the Blood”, (2017) LQR 36 at 39. 
42  1986 Act, s5(1)(a) and (b).  
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nothing further is done in law to protect this social position, or balance it against a competing 
biological/genetic challenge, when it comes to rebutting the presumptions. Such protection 
previously existed – not least through a lack of scientific certainty, which made it difficult to 
prove conclusively the lack of genetic connection.  But the certainties of DNA testing, coupled 
with legal reform, have fundamentally shifted the balance struck by these statutory 
presumptions, so that the social position of the father has been entirely supplanted by the 
genetic one. Two reforms in the last 30 years add up to more than the sum of their parts, with 
significant consequences for parents and children.  These are (i) the removal of the status of 
illegitimacy and (ii) the corresponding revision downwards of the high standard for proving 
illegitimacy.  
 
The 1986 Act stripped the doctrine of illegitimacy of much of its content: section 1 (originally 
entitled “Legal equality of children”) stated: “The fact that a person’s parents are not or have 
not been married to one another shall be left out of account in establishing the legal 
relationship between the person and any other person”.  Twenty years later, the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 2006 revised the 1986 Act to abolish the status of illegitimacy altogether, so 
that section 1 of the Act is now entitled “Abolition of status of illegitimacy” and starts with 
the categorical statement: “No person whose status is governed by Scots law shall be 
illegitimate”.43 These legal changes reflect a relaxing of the social attitudes to being born 
outside marriage, and the fact that it is now more common than not to be born outside 
marriage.44   
 
When the social and legal consequences of illegitimacy were severe, children were protected 
from these damaging consequences by the high standard to be met before the law would 
recognise that the pater est presumption had been overturned.  For example, as held in 
Russell v Russell,45 it was not possible for a husband or wife to give evidence of non-
intercourse in order to render illegitimate a child born during the marriage.  Yet once the legal 
(and social) consequences of illegitimacy were no longer widely significant, the test for 
                                                          
43 The one remaining area where illegitimacy is still relevant is in the succession to titles, honours, dignities and 
coats of arms, as per s9 of the 1986 Act. 
44 In 2015 51.2% of children in Scotland were born to unmarried parents: “Scotland’s Population: The Registrar 
General’s Annual Review of Demographic Trends”, National Registers of Scotland, 2015. 
45 [1924] AC 687. 
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overturning the pater est presumption was correspondingly relaxed.  Most significantly, the 
test for rebutting the presumption was revised downwards from beyond reasonable doubt (a 
near-impossible standard in the days before DNA testing) to a balance of probabilities: a test 
which can easily be met by the scientific accuracy of a DNA test.   
 
A declarator of non-parentage would render the child illegitimate. Even if the legal 
consequences of “illegitimacy” no longer exist, there are still significant legal consequences 
arising from a declarator of non-parentage, as regards parental responsibilities and rights, 
succession, aliment, and domicile, not to mention the day-to-day social parent/child 
relationship. And while children might not suffer any social stigma from being found to be 
illegitimate, the social consequences for the individual parent/child relationship could of 
course be extensive. 
   
These reforms therefore illustrate the danger of focusing on one aspect of law reform without 
considering the bigger picture.  Recognising that illegitimacy is no longer legally or socially 
significant led to the downwards revision in the standard of proof to establish it: but this was 
done without consideration for the parents and children who are thus more easily deprived 
of the parent/child relationship.  Although the stigma and legal status of illegitimacy may no 
longer be a concern, it would be a mistake to think that unpicking a parent and child 
relationship based solely on genetics is an insignificant step. Yet there has been no sustained 
assessment of the impact of these legal shifts, or how they operate in a changed and changing 
society.   
 
As this section has shown, the cumulative impact of legal and scientific developments work 
against the interests of parents and children. The removal of the stigma of illegitimacy, 
coupled with the reduced standard of proof to challenge parentage, and the definitive 
answers now available through DNA testing, mean that genetics has been elevated to a 
conclusive and straightforward answer to the question “who then is my father?”    
 
Yet alongside this has been an expansion in the range of other parent/child relationships 
which benefit from legal recognition where there is no biological link between parent and 
child.  As noted above, adoption, surrogacy and donor conception all provide examples of a 
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break in the legal chain from biology to parental status. While these s are not the focus of this 
article, they do demonstrate that a biological connection is not a necessary prerequisite for 
legal recognition of family, let alone the social function of it. Legal parental status must be 
recognised for what it is: a legal concept.  There is no obvious need for this legal concept to 
map onto the biological reality of who the genetic progenitors are. Indeed, developments in 
this vein can be seen in those jurisdictions which are now recognising three or more legal 
parents.46  Since a child cannot have three progenitors, at least one of the parents in these 
jurisdictions must achieve their legal parental status through some other (social) factor.47   
 
While DNA evidence may be invaluable – not least given its conclusive nature – the greater 
weight given to biology in instances of natural insemination sits uncomfortably with the 
broader understanding of the parent/child relationship in other spheres. Greater recognition 
of this is essential, not least to tackle three specific objections to relying exclusively upon 
biology and genetics to determine the parent/child relationship. 
 
 
4 The Limits of Biology in Legal Parental Status 
 
4.1 Dismantling the parent/child relationship 
The first and arguably gravest concern is that biology, and particularly DNA evidence of the 
genetic link, is typically adduced to dismantle a parent/child relationship which actually exists 
on the ground – to prove that the existing or presumed parental nexus should no longer be 
recognised in law, through a declarator of non-parentage.  This can be done by the existing 
father seeking to prove he is not the genetic father, as in the case of CS v KS and JS.  
                                                          
46 The Ontario Supreme Court has recognised that a child may have more than two parents, in a 2007 decision: 
A.A. v. B.B., 2007 ONCA 2. Section 30 of British Columbia’s Family Law Act [SBC 2011] also allows three 
parties to reach agreement, before the conception of a child, that all three will be parents..  In the Netherlands, a 
government report has recommended the legal recognition of multi-parent families in certain circumstances: 
“Child and Parents in the 21st Century” (2016), at para 11.2.5. 
47 There is a new medical development which allows three parties to be genetically related to one child, but this 
is still rare and – importantly – it is not the basis on which the legal recognition of three parents has been made. 
In cases of mitochondrial IVF, there is a very small (less than 1%) genetic contribution from a second woman to 
the egg of the first woman, thus meaning two women are involved in the egg that creates the child. Coupled 
with the male who provides the sperm, this means that 3 adults are involved in the genetic creation of the child, 
but there is no legal provision for the third adult here (the woman who donates the mitochondrial DNA) to be 




Alternatively, it can be instigated by a third party, perhaps seeking to prove that he is the 
genetic father, thereby supplanting the person who is currently filling that role.  In this case, 
someone who is currently the legal father will be stripped of that status and, if he is also the 
social parent, providing day to day  care, he risks being undermined or – worse – ejected from 
this social role by virtue of the change in legal status.  In these cases, there is no limit as to 
who can raise an action for a declarator of non-parentage: it could be the man currently 
named as the legal father; it could be the man who claims the biological – and legal – 
connection instead; or it could be any other party seeking to remove the existing “father” 
from the child’s life.  The fact that there is no limit on who can raise the action places biological 
truth at the heart of the legal parental status: if there were restrictions on who could seek a 
declarator of non-parentage, it would imply that there was more to the issue than simply 
identifying the genetic progenitor. Instead, if the question is exclusively one of biological 
truth, then there should be – and indeed is – no limit as to who can seek to uncover that truth.  
 
Whether the pursuer is the current father or a third party challenger, the role of the biological 
evidence (and the legal challenge it is supporting) will be a negative one: to dismantle a 
relationship which exists in reality.  The damage is compounded because a declarator of non-
parentage does not require a corresponding declarator of parentage to establish an 
alternative parent in place of the one removed.  Thus, the legal effect is to dismantle the legal 
– and frequently the practical – relationship, without any need to consider what will take its 
place. And whether the child or other involved parties, such as the mother, fervently support 
or fervently oppose the petition is irrelevant: there is no scope for the exercise of any 
discretion to reflect their needs or views.  Where an existing parent/child relationship is struck 
down as a result of DNA or other evidence demonstrating that the “father” is not the genetic 
father, there is risk of considerable emotional damage to the child, and potentially the father.  
This situation has parallels with litigation from adoption and care cases, where disputes arise 
as to whether children should be removed from foster families or placed in adoption, against 
the wishes of genetic parents.  The risk of undermining an established social parent/child 
relationship has long been recognised here: in the words of Cumming-Bruce LJ in 1985, “… 
you cannot dig up children in the way that you dig up geraniums: they form emotional roots 
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and those roots have to be preserved intact.”48 His emphasis here is on the emotional roots: 
not the genetic ones. His comments were approved by Lord Oliver of Aylmerton in 198849 and 
more recently by the Outer House of the Court of Session in 2016.50 Roots also featured in 
Midlothian Council re Child S51 in 2012, where Lord Malcolm was very clear that the status 
quo which required to be protected was the established and stable social relationship, not 
the genetic one.52  In public law cases regarding care, therefore, it seems that genetics alone 
is not enough to displace a settled and happy placement for the child,53 yet it remains the 
primary driver for establishing legal parental status in private law actions. If the state is 
prepared to recognise the importance of stable social parenting (and accord it legal status, 
through adoption) in care cases, then there must be good reason to apply a different standard 
driven by genetics rather than social attachment, in private law disputes.    
 
4.2 Establishing the parent/child relationship 
Whereas the concerns above focused on the use of biological and DNA evidence to dismantle 
a parent/ child relationship, conversely, where a party seeks to establish a relationship by 
virtue of such evidence, different concerns arise. Again, however, the needs and views of the 
parties involved are not provided for by statute, and their support or opposition has no role 
to play in the decision to grant a declarator of parentage in terms of the 1986 Act. Yet it seems 
probable that any attempt to assert a parent/child relationship by virtue of such evidence will 
typically be in the face of opposition from at least one of the other parties, ie the other parent 
and/or the child.  In cases where there is no such opposition, and all parties consent, then 
DNA evidence could be used to prove that a father is entitled to be recognised in law as the 
parent, and reflected in an uncontested petition for a declarator of parentage.  If all parties 
consent that the man is to be recognised as the father, this is uncontroversial: recognising the 
social reality – the psychological parent in Lady Hale’s words54 – has more to commend it as 
                                                          
48 In re L. (Child in Care: Access) [1985] F.L.R. 95, 100.  
49 In re KD (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) [1988] 1 AC 806 at 829-830. 
50 West Lothian Council, Petrs [2016] CSOH 50. 
51 [2012] CSOH 63 (upheld on appeal: [2013] CSIH 71). 
52 [2012] CSOH 63, at paras 186-187. 
53 See also Alison Diduck, “‘If only we can find the appropriate terms to use the issue will be solved’: Law, 
identity and parenthood”, (2007) 19(4) CFLQ 458, at 468. 
54 In re G (children) [2005] UKHL 43, para 33, per Lady Hale. 
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the basis for a day-to-day parent/child relationship than a contested action for declarator 
founded on the bare fact of a DNA test.   
 
This is especially the case in light of Article 8 jurisprudence from the ECtHR in Anayo v 
Germany,55 where the Court held that: 
a biological kinship between a natural parent and a child alone, without any further 
legal or factual elements indicating the existence of a close personal relationship, is 
insufficient to attract the protection of Article 8… As a rule, cohabitation is a 
requirement for a relationship amounting to family life.  Exceptionally, other factors 
may also serve to demonstrate that a relationship has sufficient constancy to create 
de facto ‘family ties’”56 
 
Pointing to biological kinship alone should not, in the eyes of the ECtHR, typically be sufficient 
to establish “family life” in terms of Article 8.  Yet this remains the approach under the 1986 
Act, where the declarator is predicated on evidence of the biological or genetic tie, without 
more. The fact that Scots law does indeed allow a declarator of parentage to be sought on 
this basis, without any indication of a “close personal relationship” arguably fails to take 
account of the ECHR jurisprudence.  Moreover, it also fails to consider the welfare principle, 
and ask what is in the best interests of the child – or what the views of the child are. 
 
4.3 The Best Interests of the Child and the Children’s Rights Triumvirate 
Perhaps the strongest argument of all against the undiscriminating reliance on genetic 
evidence is the need to consider the rights of the child.  The three rights at the heart of judicial 
(and state) protection of children are (i) the best interests of the child; (ii) the right of the child 
to express his/her views; and (iii) the “no order” principle. In compliance with Article 3 of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”), any decision by a court concerning a 
child should regard the best interests of the child as a primary consideration – and, where 
incorporated in Scots law by statute, this has been elevated to the paramount 
consideration.57  Article 12 UNCRC obliges States Parties to assure to the child the right to 
express his/her views freely in all matters affecting the child.58 But despite these fundamental 
UNCRC principles, there is no overarching duty on the Scottish courts to consider the welfare 
                                                          
55 Anayo v Germany [2010] ECHR 2083. 
56 Anayo v Germany [2010] ECHR 2083, para 56. 
57 See for example, the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s11(7)(a). 
58 For statutory examples in Scots law, see the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s6 and s11(7)(b). 
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of the child in every situation, or to ascertain his/her views, so these are only relevant rights 
where there is a specific statutory direction to respect them.59 
 
Where a declarator (of parentage or non-parentage) is sought in respect of a child under the 
age of 16, it seems plain that a legal decision of such magnitude should be subject to a 
statutory duty to consider the rights of the child, and most critically, the welfare principle. But 
in all cases of natural insemination, the legal father will be determined solely by biology: there 
is no power or discretion for a Scottish court to consider the best interests of the child in 
deciding whether to admit evidence which would establish or dismantle a parent/child 
relationship. It is not open to a judge to exercise any discretion or consider the best interests 
or views of the child, since the statutory test for a declarator is non-discretionary. Where the 
court finds that the parent is, or is not, the biological progenitor, that will be determinative 
of the question of legal parental status. A court is therefore unable to consider the impact of 
any declarator on an existing parent/child relationship, or the risks of removing or imposing 
such a relationship – in legal terms at least – upon a child.  Likewise, there is no requirement 
for the court to ascertain the views of the child, and how the declarator might affect them. 
Consequent upon this, there is also no obligation on the court to establish that it is better for 
the order to be made than not: there is no presumption in favour of the status quo under the 
1986 Act. The statutory test is therefore based solely on assessing the evidence of a biological 
connection – usually, these days, based on DNA evidence, but as CS v KS and JS shows, also 
by placing weight on a range of factors, including the physical resemblance (or lack of) 
between adult and child. 
 
This triumvirate of rights does, of course, only apply to children under the age of 16. Where a 
declarator is sought in respect of a parent/child relationship where the child (i) is over 16; or 
(ii) has died, then there could never be any scope for considering the best interests of the 
child, or the views of the child, or the no order principle, since there will be no child under the 
age of 16 to whom they could apply.  
                                                          
59 Elaine E Sutherland, “Scotland: The Marriage of Principle and Pragmatism”, in Elaine E Sutherland (ed) The 
Future of Child and Family Law (CUP, 2012), para 12.13. For a debate about the merits of incorporation see: 
Elaine E Sutherland, “Supplementary Written Evidence to the Education and Culture Committee of the Scottish 
Parliament”, 28 October 2013; and Kenneth Norrie, Oral Evidence to the Education and Culture Committee of 




5. The Case for Reform: Challenging the biological prerogative  
As is clear, Scots law focuses exclusively on biology when determining parentage, at the 
expense of social parenting and the rights of the child, including welfare. Yet it is not axiomatic 
that the law should operate this way.  Examples from France, the USA, and Germany all offer 
different approaches, which typically place the social family and welfare at the heart of the 
matter. French law offers protection for social relationships, for example, by tightly 
controlling access to DNA evidence. There is a complete prohibition on DNA testing without 
the prior consent of the court, and it is illegal to buy or use a DNA test without such consent.60 
There are grave concerns with an approach which denies individuals access to such 
fundamental information and, as was made clear at the outset, concealing such information 
is not a position supported in this article. Nevertheless, the French approach highlights the 
legal preference given there to social families over genetics, and the need for judicial 
authorisation before allowing genetic evidence to be brought to bear on the question of legal 
parental status. Similarly, the USA’s Uniform Parentage Act gives the court authority to deny 
a motion for genetic testing to determine paternity where this is not in the best interest of 
the child, taking account of factors such as the length of time during which the presumed 
father has acted as father, the nature of their relationship, and the age of the child.61   
 
German law also limits reliance on DNA evidence, by recognising that the best interests of the 
(minor) child might outweigh the claims of the person seeking clarification:  
The court suspends the proceeds [to clarify genetic parentage] if and so long as the 
clarification of the natural parentage would result in a considerable adverse effect on 
the best interests of the minor child which would be unreasonable for the child even 
taking into account the concerns of the person entitled to clarify.62 
There is also a restriction in Germany as to who can challenge parental status: sec 1600 BGB 
limits the classes of people who can challenge a presumption of paternity.63  The five 
categories of person who can challenge are:  
1. the father (as defined by sec 1592 BGB, which includes the pater est presumption); 
                                                          
60 French Penal Code, art 226-28.  
61 Uniform Parentage Act 2006, section 608(b). 
62 BGB, Section 1598(a)(3). 
63 BGB, Section 1600, subsection 1 
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2. a man who declares he had sexual intercourse with the mother during the period of 
conception; 
3. the mother; 
4. the child; and 
5. the competent authority.64 . 
Where a man seeks to show that he is the father by virtue of having had sexual intercourse 
with the mother at the period of conception (rather than being married to her), he can only 
do so where there is “no social and family relationship between the child and its father…, and 
that the person contesting is the natural father of the child.”65  Thus, a third party could not 
step in and challenge another man’s paternity where the other man has an existing social and 
family relationship with the child (defined to mean “actual responsibility” for the child66).  
Such an approach preferences an established family relationship over any challenge based 
solely on DNA evidence.   
 
Essentially, in these systems, the state is giving priority to the legal status, typically founded 
on social relationships, through the pater est presumption, rather than deferring to the 
genetic fact.  Crucially, that legal status takes account of a wider range of factors than only 
biology. Before the advent of DNA testing, it is arguable that a similar approach was taken in 
the UK. As Professor Diduck has argued, a focus on social and psychological relationships used 
to be regarded as essential to safeguard the family unit which existed on the ground. In 
contrast, a legal focus on biology in paternity disputes was regarded as potentially 
detrimental to the welfare of the child, because of the disruption to the established social 
relationships which the child enjoyed. Yet, as she concludes, the ability to know genetic 
origins, through DNA testing, has resulted in a significant shift:  
Now that we can know the biological – or at least the genetic – ‘truth’, it seems that 
in the interests of our well-being, we must know. And not only must we know, it has 
now become our right to know. We seem happy to be in thrall to biology or nature 
again in a way that has been unknown for years. 67 
 
                                                          
64 Defined with reference to BGB sec 1592. 
65 BGB, Section 1600, subsection 2. 
66 BGB, Section 1600, subsection 4. 
67 Alison Diduck, “‘If only we can find the appropriate terms to use the issue will be solved’: Law, identity and 
parenthood”, (2007) 19(4) CFLQ 458, at 468, emphasis added, references omitted. 
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It can of course be argued that knowledge of the genetic truth is always in the best interests 
of the child, and it is certainly not the purpose of this article to argue in favour of suppression 
of that genetic knowledge.  In promoting the need to know this truth, Professor Norrie has 
argued that “resolving of doubt about his or her parentage, which DNA profiling now 
conclusively allows, will nearly always weigh more heavily than the protection of rights that 
may be falsely based.”68  Yet while this holds good when legal parental rights (and status) are 
derived from the biological connection, it also perpetuates the belief that legal rights which 
are not based on genetics are “false”, and therefore do not and should not merit protection.  
It is this approach which is at the heart of my argument.  There can be no objection to 
establishing the truth of the genetic progenitor, but there can be serious concerns, as 
demonstrated above, about translating that automatically to a conclusion as to who should 
be, in law, the parent – and in doing so, concluding that any other claim to parental status is 
“false”.  As Dr Smith has highlighted, this emphasis on biology as a basis for parenting confuses 
the role of progenitor and social parent: “At the heart of this… lies a biological determinism 
which elides completely the genetic preconditions of procreation with a value statement 
about the most desirable social parenting practices.”69 At the very least, relying exclusively on 
“biological determinism” with no reference to the wider social issues is certainly not in the 




It should be possible for the legal system (and indeed society) to distinguish between the 
biological truth and the legal import of that information.  The state is already well used to 
doing so in cases of adoption, donor conception and surrogacy.  Where a child is conceived 
through donor sperm or eggs for example, and where the intending parents have followed 
the approved statutory route, then the law recognises that the donor is not the legal parent, 
despite the critical biological role they have played in creating the child.  It is clear that the 
state does not have to equate genetic progenitors with parents: moreover, to treat biology 
                                                          
68 Norrie and Wilkinson, The Law of Parent and Child in Scotland, 3rd edition (W Green, 2013), para 3.33. See 
also, for example, Andrew Bainham “Arguments about Parentage”, 2008 CLJ 322, at 325-328. 
69 Leanne Smith, “Clashing Symbols? Reconciling support for fathers and fatherless families after the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008”, 2010 22(1) CFLQ 46 at 64. 
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as the infallible marker of legal parental status fails to take cognisance of the rights of the 
child, especially the welfare principle.  
 
I would therefore contend that Scots law needs to revisit the test for a declarator of non-
parentage.  The pater est presumption recognises that a man married to the mother, or the 
man acknowledged by the mother, is presumed to be the father, thereby placing social 
relationships at the heart of the parenting relationship. Any steps to challenge that 
presumption should likewise reflect this social dynamic. Law reform is needed to ensure that 
biology alone cannot create or destroy the legal parent/child relationship.    
 
It is proposed that three principles should be introduced in Scots law, to apply when any 
declarator of parentage or non-parentage is sought in terms of the 1986 Act in cases of natural 
insemination. 
 
The first proposal is to embed the rights of the child, and specifically the welfare principle, 
into this test, so that any steps to create or remove a parent/child relationship in law look to 
what is in the best interests of the child in question.70  The need for the court to ascertain the 
views of the child should also be explicitly included. Not only is this in line with the UNCRC, it 
also recognises that the parent/child relationship is a legal and a social construct, and must 
therefore take account of the wider social context.  Thus, a judge must be satisfied that a 
declarator of parentage or non-parentage is in the best interests of the child before the 
application is granted, and part of that welfare assessment would include ascertaining the 
views of the child, and consideration of the no order principle.  Norrie rejects such an 
approach, stating that disclosure of the truth of paternity is consistent with the child’s 
welfare:  
The consequences of the establishment of paternity may well be governed by the 
welfare principle but whether and how paternity is established ought not to be. In any 
                                                          
70 There is no obligation to consider the best interests of the child in any of the provisions of the HFEA 1990 or 
2008 regarding the legal parents, although this is not surprising since there is no child in existence at the time 
the adults receive treatment under the Act. There is, however, a duty on clinics in terms of their licence: section 
13(5) of the 1990 Act states that the clinic should not provide treatment to a woman “unless account has been 
taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as the result of the treatment (including the need of the child 
for supportive parenting…”. 
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case, the welfare of the child should be accepted as being best served by the 
establishment of the truth.71  
Again, however, this equates genetic fact with (legal) paternity. Instead, a distinction can be 
made between establishing genetic truth and the separate question of the legal “truth” of 
who is the parent, in law – and this second question offers scope for the application of the 
welfare test. The existence of such a test would mean that, whatever decision the court 
reached, we could be confident that it was taken with the benefit of the full picture of the 
parent/child relationship, and not just one element of that: genetics.  
 
A statutory test to have regard to best interests and children’s rights would, of course, fall 
away when the child in question reached 16 years,72 or had died.73 Accordingly, there should 
also be a statutory discretion to consider the relevant circumstances of the case, which would 
apply beyond the age of 16, or in circumstances where the child in question had pre-deceased 
the lodging of the petition. This would enable the court to hear any relevant evidence, 
including (as may be) defences or responses lodged by the adult child, the mother or (in some 
circumstances) the existing legal father.  
 
The second principle I would recommend Scots law adopting is to set a clear statutory limit 
to the class of persons who can seek a declarator of parentage/ non-parentage. The 1986 Act 
currently sets no limits as to who can seek a declarator, in terms of s7. It is therefore possible 
that any person with title could, for honest or malicious reason, seek a declarator, in the face 
of opposition from other involved parties: the current (social and legal) father, the child, or 
the mother.74  Instead, it is recommended that, Scots law should restrict the people who can 
apply for a declarator of parentage or non-parentage, as in Germany, to a defined group: the 
legal father; the mother; the child; potentially the state; and a man who claims to be the 
genetic father, but only where he has leave of the court to apply. In determining whether to 
                                                          
71 AB Wilkinson and Kenneth McK Norrie, The Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland, 3rd edn by 
Kenneth McK Norrie (SULI, 2013), para 3.30. 
72 Or 18, or other stated age of capacity, as specified in legislation in future years. 
73 1986 Act, s7(2)(c) allows a post mortem challenge. 
74 Norrie suggests that “while the parents and child are all alive, it will be rarely, if ever, that others have a title 
to seek a declarator of parentage” (and notes a statutory exception in the Child Support Act 1991, s28): AB 
Wilkinson and Kenneth McK Norrie, The Law Relating to Parent and Child in Scotland, 3rd edn by Kenneth 
McK Norrie (SULI, 2013), para 3.24. Nonetheless, the lack of statutory guidance as to who has title to sue 
leaves a worrying gap in the current regime.   
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grant leave, the court could have regard to factors such as whether there is already a person 
fulfilling the role of father (as in German law), and the best interests of the child. Conversely, 
where a man is the father by virtue of the pater est presumption, and he has also been 
fulfilling the role of father (ie acting as father in a social and psychological context), then it is 
proposed that his right to petition for a declarator of non-parentage should continue, but with 
the proposed statutory obligation on the judge to consider (i) the best interests of the child 
as the paramount consideration; and (ii) all relevant circumstances. Cumulatively, these 
proposals would operate to protect the child and family as an existing social entity, while 
leaving the door open for judicial consideration of any unusual and unexpected cases which 
may arise.     
 
The third principle which would also help to protect the social reality as well as the legal status 
is to introduce a time limit for any such claim.  Specifically, any claim should be made during 
the lifetime of both parties (that is, the pursuer and the child in question): attempting to 
change the (former) legal status of deceased parties when they are not able to defend the 
claim would require good cause.  This is borne out by the case of Pringle of Stichill.  A post 
mortem limit on challenges to paternity would also reflect the concerns voiced by the 
European Court of Human Rights, which has recognised that post mortem questions of 
paternity are “emotionally and culturally charged”,75 especially where any testing will require 
a body to be exhumed. Considerations of ascertaining the genetic truth must be balanced 
against the right to respect for the dead, and for the surviving relatives – and, for obvious 
reasons, a challenge here does not even offer the advantage of establishing a social 
parent/child relationship. Allied to this, the rationale for a post mortem challenge is more 
likely to be financial gain, than social benefit. The introduction of an inter vivos limit would 
require statutory reform, as s7(2)(c) of the 1986 Act specifically provides for an action to be 
brought where the alleged parent or child died before the date of the action.  
 
While these proposals would impact on legal parental status, by restricting when a declarator 
of parentage or non-parentage can be sought, there would be nothing to stop Scots law 
                                                          
75 Jaggi v Switzerland, Appl No. 58757/00, 13 July 2006; R. J. Blauwhoff, ‘Tracing down the historical 
development of the legal concept of the right to know one’s origins: Has “to know or not to know” ever been the 
legal question?’, (2008) Vol 4 Utrecht Law Review 99, at 110. 
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introducing a separate declarator, being a declarator of genetic status or origin.76  This would 
ensure the genetic truth is known to all parties (especially the child), and would therefore 
respect that connection, while not converting it into a legal status.  Whether such a genetic 
declarator would always be appropriate (for example, in cases of rape or incest, or indeed 
against the child’s or mother’s will) is a debate for another day: the right to know can clash 
with the right not to know.77  It remains the case, however, that the legal system could respect 
the genetic reality without conflating it with the legal (and typically social) reality.  Such a 
declarator may have a particular role to play in cases where either party is now deceased: it 
would ensure the historical record is accurate, without revisiting legal and social relationships 
which have, necessarily, come to an end.      
 
7. Conclusion 
Social change can drive law reform, and law reform can push forward social change.  In this 
area, changing social norms removed the stigma of illegitimacy, and legal reform rightly 
recognised this, by removing the legal consequences of being born out of wedlock.  Yet this 
has also shown that law reform can have unexpected and possibly unintended consequences.  
The resulting emphasis on genetics, with no checks and balances to recognise the social 
parenting role, has created a situation where Scots law will dismantle, or create, a legal 
parental relationship based on scientific fact.  The interests of all parties – child, father and 
mother – may not be best served by an approach which focuses on biology at the expense of 
social parenting.  And the best interests of the child will certainly not be served by a legal 
system which promotes a genetic connection as the touchstone for the parent/child 
relationship, without stopping to consider how that will affect the day to day life of the child 
and his or her existing social parental (and indeed sibling) relationships. 
                                                          
76  Proposals have been advanced in Germany whereby either party could seek genetic information on an 
“exclusively informational” basis, with no legal consequences for the established parent relationship: Richard J 
Blauwhoff, “Tracing down the historical development of the legal concept of the right to know one’s origins: 
Has ‘to know or not to know’ ever been the legal question?”, (2008) Vol 4 Utrecht Law Review 99 at 113. In a 
similar vein, there have been academic proposals in the UK for birth certificates to contain information about 
both the genetic “parents” and the legal parents in cases of assisted reproduction: Andrew Bainham, 
“Arguments about Parentage” 2008 CLJ 322 at 336. See also Elaine E Sutherland, “Scotland: The Marriage of 
Principle and Pragmatism”, in Elaine E Sutherland (ed) The Future of Child and Family Law (CUP, 2012), para 
12.20 et seq. 
77 See further Jonathan Herring and Charles Foster, “Please Don’t Tell Me”, 21(1) Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics (2012) 20; R. J. Blauwhoff, ‘Tracing down the historical development of the legal concept of 
the right to know one’s origins: Has “to know or not to know” ever been the legal question?’, (2008) Vol 4 




The question of how to deal with biological ties and genetic evidence requires consideration 
of what is at the very heart of our understanding of the parent/child relationship.  But now 
that it is possible to know the genetic connection with certainty – as a matter of fact – we 
need to consider how our legal system and our society will respond to that fact.  This article 
has shown that introducing additional measures would protect the social and psychological 
relationships in existence and enable judges to take a more sensitive and nuanced approach 
to determining who should have legal parental status.  As with jurisdictions such as the USA 
and Germany, we should ensure that established relationships are recognised, through 
limiting those with standing to seek a declarator of parentage or non-parentage and, ideally, 
imposing time limits on any challenge.  Moreover, by ensuring any declarator cannot be 
granted without considering the rights of the child or the wider relevant circumstances, we 
would recognise that biology alone should not determine the matter.  Such reforms would 
help ensure we can give the best possible answer to the question “Who then is my parent?” 
 
 
